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H.L. Mencken said, “Democracy is the theory that the 
common people know what they want and deserve to get it good 
and hard.”1 Alexandra Klein demonstrates that while Mencken’s 
impatience with democracy may be justified, his observation is 
built on a fallacy: “the people” do not exist; majorities and 
minorities do. 
This is a foundational part of U.S. constitutional history. The 
division of federal powers among three branches, the division of 
national powers between the states and the federal government, 
the justification for a large republic, staggered electoral terms, 
and an independent judiciary with the power to declare 
legislation unconstitutional are all part of a governmental 
scheme designed to check the power of popular majorities.2  
The same fear of tyrannical majorities that animated the 
Framers also prompted the Supreme Court to subject legislation 
that threatened the freedom of “discrete and insular minorities” 
to a much more exacting scrutiny than it used for other 
legislation.3 In United States v. Carolene Products, Justice Stone 
stated this in the famous fourth footnote to his opinion of the 
Court: 
                                                                                                     
 * Waxberg Professor of Politics and Law and Director, Center for 
International Education, Washington and Lee University. 
 1. H.L. MENCKEN, A LITTLE BOOK IN C MAJOR 19 (1916). 
 2. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 3. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
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There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption 
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be 
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those 
of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific 
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. 
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which 
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be 
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation is to 
be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the 
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are 
most other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the right 
to vote, on restraints upon the dissemination of information, 
on interferences with political organizations, as to prohibition 
of peaceable assembly. 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into 
the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or racial 
minorities, whether prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to 
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to 
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.4 
But Carolene Products signaled a surrender by the Court. It 
would no longer subject economic rights to the same strict 
scrutiny that it continued to employ when dealing with discrete 
and insular minorities and more fundamental rights such as 
those noted in footnote four.5 Working from the assumption that 
economic legislation affected rich and poor alike and, therefore, 
the political process would resolve any controversies regarding 
such laws, the Court retreated from imposing anything more 
than “rational basis” review on economic legislation.6 
While this may have made sense in 1938, Alexandra Klein 
argues that it no longer does so. She demonstrates that the 
economic marketplace does indeed generate discrete and insular 
minorities. The market is neither fair nor efficient. It is as subject 
                                                                                                     
 4. Id. (citations omitted). 
 5. See generally TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING 125 
(2010). 
 6. See id. at 153 (“[L]egislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions 
is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made 
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the 
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and 
experience of the legislators.”). 
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to domination by special interests akin to the factions Madison 
feared in Federalist 10 as the political marketplace. Economic 
rights, she argues, are no less important than the other 
“fundamental” rights outlined by Justice Stone. Insofar as the 
economic marketplace is unjust, the Court can no longer justify 
treating challenges to economic regulations with the “kid gloves” 
of rational basis review. 
II. The Evidence 
In focusing on occupational licensing schemes, Klein 
brilliantly uses what may seem to be very local or arcane issues 
to demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the Court’s approach to 
states’ rights, the federal division of powers, and economic 
freedoms. There is, as she notes, something peculiarly wrong in 
the political and economic system if it can take longer to become a 
pet groomer than it does to become an emergency medical 
technician. There also is something awry when the standards for 
getting licensed in particular professions can vary radically from 
state to state.7 
Even if one is a staunch defender of the federal structure of 
the United States’ constitutional system, it is hard to justify 
radical interstate differences in licensing requirements for the 
same profession. While the differences in or unique aspects of 
local topography and climate may render it inefficient to 
administer land use or waterways with a one size fits all policy 
emanating from Washington, it is hard to believe that toenails, 
hair, and pets (not to mention dentistry or heart surgery) vary 
much from state to state.8 Defenders of federalism can seek 
refuge in romantic notions of states’ rights, traditional state 
functions, and romantic, Tocquevillian notions of states as 
“laboratories of democracy.”9 But those laboratories of innovation 
                                                                                                     
 7. See generally Alexandra Klein, The Freedom to Pursue a Common 
Calling: Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to Occupational Licensing Statutes, 73 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411 (2016); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and 
Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209 (2016). 
 8. Klein, supra note 7, at 414–15 n.14–22. 
 9. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
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and progress have had a less romantic history as barriers to 
interstate commerce10 and backwaters of clientelism and 
discrimination. 
Klein argues that there is a clear justification for states to 
impose licensing schemes to ensure the integrity of professions, 
quality of services, and to protect the public interest. No one 
would doubt the need to ensure that surgeons are licensed. But 
she argues that special interests have captured state legislatures 
and transformed licensing schemes from mechanisms to protect 
the public interest at the expense of private interests to perverse 
practices that protect private interests at the expense of the 
public.11 The result, she argues, is a debasement of the individual 
right to pursue a common calling. 
III. A Common Calling 
We see this right first alluded to in Corfield v. Coryell.12 
There, Justice Bushrod Washington asserted that the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause13 includes “the right to acquire and 
possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain 
happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as 
the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the 
whole.”14 From this, the court concluded that “the pursuit of a 
                                                                                                     
 10. See generally S.C. State Highway Dep’t. v. Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S. 
177 (1938) (allowing state action to burden interstate commerce through state 
regulations on weight and width of trucks on state highways); S. Pac. Co. v. 
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (noting that a state regulation on railroad 
transportation interfered with the Commerce Clause). 
 11. See Larkin, supra note 7, at 235  
Where does that leave us? With this remarkable irony. The 
justification for regulation has come full circle. Originally, the 
rationale was that government intervention would remedy economic 
market failures in furtherance of the public interest. Today, we see 
that government intervention causes political market failures in 
furtherance of private interests. Government has become the 
problem, not the solution. 
 12. 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823). 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 14. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552–53. 
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common calling is one of the most fundamental of those privileges 
protected by the Clause.”15 
Despite Washington’s broad definition of economic rights and 
his extraction of a right to pursue a common calling from the 
general wording of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the 
court—and Washington—nevertheless upheld New Jersey’s 
prohibition against out-of-staters harvesting oysters and clams 
because the creatures were common property of New Jersey 
citizens.16 It seemed that the right to a common calling could stop 
at a state line. State lines ultimately yielded to the fundamental 
right to travel in decisions such as Edwards v. California17 and 
Saenz v. Roe.18 But the scope and definition of the right to a 
common calling remained somewhat nebulous. 
The right to pursue a common calling or honest living is not 
sui generis. It depends on a state power to differentiate between 
legal and illegal means of making a living. The Court upheld a 
state’s power to make this differentiation when it sustained 
Kansas’s prohibition of debt adjustment in Ferguson v. Skrupa.19 
In leaving this authority to the states, the Court maintained:  
We refuse to sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of 
legislation, and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time 
when courts used the Due Process Clause to strike down state 
laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because 
they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a 
particular school of thought.20  
Thus, Klein seems to be on the horns of a dilemma. The right 
she wishes to protect (common calling) is the creation of the same 
legislative power that creates the occupational licensing schemes 
that she wants to regulate. This is the same power that lets 
states decide whether or not to permit alcohol, prostitution, and 
                                                                                                     
 15. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 
208, 219 (1984). 
 16. See Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552 (“[I]t would, in our opinion, be going quite 
too far to construe the grant of privileges and immunities of citizens, as 
amounting to a grant of a cotenancy in the common property of the state, to the 
citizens of all the other states.”). 
 17. 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
 18. 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
 19. 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
 20. Id. at 731–32.  
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the use of marijuana. If we trust a state with such powers, why 
do we withdraw that trust when it comes to licensing fortune 
tellers? 
As Klein points out, this conundrum lies at the intersection 
of public choice theory and constitutional law. Political processes 
and markets will inevitably be captured by small, powerful 
groups that exert disproportionate influence and can therefore 
extract rents from the political process at the expense of the 
general public and, one would argue, the common good.21 
Accordingly, Klein demonstrates that we should trust courts to 
police the economic marketplace in the same way that John Hart 
Ely called upon them to police the political marketplace in 
Democracy and Distrust.22 As a result, Klein eloquently argues 
that economic rights should no longer be granted second-class 
status. 
IV. Back to the Future? The Primacy of Economic Rights 
 In this respect, she touches upon one of the issues that the 
Founders regarded as most compelling: the protection of property 
and markets. It is not often noted that the First Amendment is 
actually the second mention of rights in the Constitution. As a 
result of the economic and political chaos under the Articles of 
Confederation, the Framers were so concerned with property 
rights and their security23 that they wrote Article I, section 10, 
which reads in part: 
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin 
Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and 
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of 
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation 
of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.24 
                                                                                                     
 21. Klein cites numerous sources. Klein, supra note 7, at 437–41. To hers, I 
add MANCUR OLSEN, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1984); ANTHONY DOWNS, 
AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); JONATHAN RAUCH, DEMOSCLEROSIS: 
THE SILENT KILLER OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1995). 
 22. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
 23. See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2004). 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
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While the Bill of Rights was designed to constrain the Federal 
Government, Article I, § 10 took dead aim at the states and, in 
particular, their electoral majorities. It protects the freedom to do 
what we will with our labor and our property. By protecting 
contracts and forbidding ex post facto laws, it prevents the state 
legislative majorities from attacking capital. The rationale was 
made manifest in Federalist 44 where Madison celebrated the 
Contract Clause: 
No state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or 
law impairing the obligation of contracts . . . [Such laws] are 
contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to 
every principle of sound legislation . . . . 
Our own experience has taught us, that additional fences 
against these dangers ought not to be omitted. Very properly, 
therefore, have the convention added this constitutional 
bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights. The 
sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy 
which has directed the public councils. They have seen with 
regret and indignation that sudden changes and legislative 
interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in 
the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and 
snares to the more industrious and less informed part of the 
community. They have seen too, that one legislative 
interference is but the first link of a long chain of repetitions, 
every subsequent interference being naturally produced by the 
effects of the preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that 
some thorough reform is wanting, which will banish 
speculations on public measures, inspire a general prudence 
and industry, and give a regular course to the business of 
society.25 
But, this economic liberty was never unlimited.  
Shortly after Justice Washington celebrated the right to 
pursue a common calling in Corfield, Justice Taney offered an 
extraordinarily circumspect observation about the nature of 
individual rights: they and their enforcement depend upon the 
prior and ongoing existence of a public interest. In Charles River 
Bridge v. Warren Bridge,26 he asserted: 
The object and end of all government is to promote the 
happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is 
                                                                                                     
 25. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison). 
 26. 36 U.S. 420 (1837). 
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established, and it can never be assumed, that the government 
intended to diminish its powers of accomplishing the end for 
which it was created . . . . The whole community . . . have a 
right to require that the power of promoting their comfort and 
convenience, and of advancing the public prosperity . . . shall 
not be considered to have been surrendered or diminished by 
the state unless it shall appear by plain words, that it was 
intended . . . . While the rights of private property are sacredly 
guarded, we must not forget that the community also has 
rights, and that the happiness and wellbeing of every citizen 
depends on their faithful preservation.27 
So, even though Harvard had secured from the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts what it thought was a monopoly to ferry people 
across the Charles River, and even though the Charles River 
Bridge Company had been guaranteed to inherit that right and 
operate as a monopoly for another decade or so when it was 
incorporated, the Court declared that the people of 
Massachusetts could override their contractual obligations and 
incorporate a rival bridge company.  
A century later, Chief Justice Hughes reasserted this vision 
of individual rights—and the need for the state to regulate the 
economic as well as political marketplace—in West Coast Hotel v. 
Parrish.28 In sustaining Washington State’s minimum wage laws 
and other restrictions on women’s employment, Justice Hughes 
stated that the exercise of rights presupposes a state power that 
can protect their exercise by restricting it. He explained that, 
“Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity 
from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the 
interests of the community.”29 Accordingly, Hughes argued that 
the Court had to take into account the context in which workers 
sought to exercise their rights and the inequality of power among 
actors in the political and economic marketplace:  
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal 
position with respect to bargaining power and thus are 
relatively defenseless against the denial of a living wage . . . is 
                                                                                                     
 27. Id. at 547–48. 
 28. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 29. Id. at 392. 
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not only detrimental to their health and well-being, but casts a 
direct burden for their support on the community.30 
The New Deal Court, which established tiers of scrutiny in 
Carolene Products also asserted the need to maintain equitable 
market conditions to protect economic actors. Klein finds herself 
in a peculiar situation: she agrees with the same court with 
which she disagrees. 
V. Conclusion: Judicial Review and Imperfect Democracy 
A minority that suffers discrimination is discrete and 
insular—regardless of whether the right at stake is property, 
contract, speech, or religion. The decision in Carolene Products to 
create tiers of scrutiny and hierarchies of rights was a judicial 
prophylactic that enabled the Court to extract itself from the 
quagmire of reviewing economic legislation while remaining 
vigilant and active with regard to political equality. The time has 
come, says Klein, to revisit and perhaps dispense with this 
prophylactic. 
Klein’s logic in this respect, is as unassailable as it is 
earthshaking. Her analysis is nothing less than a call for a 
constitutional or federal revolution and a remarkable increase in 
judicial activism. With regard to federalism, what Klein calls for 
is a reassertion of the principles that animated much of the 
Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence: the states 
could not balkanize the national economy. With regard to 
property or economic rights, she calls for a resuscitation of the 
principles that underpinned Lochner v. New York:31 the Court 
cannot simply turn a blind eye to the rent-seeking behavior that 
permeates politics. But, are we prepared to give the judiciary the 
final say regarding the necessity and rationality of licensing 
schemes—or any other legislation? 
Judges are not experts in economic or other professional 
regulation. They are trained as lawyers—not as pet groomers, 
land use regulators, or surgeons. As a result, it has become 
manifest that the courts struggle to analyze or offer informed 
                                                                                                     
 30. Id. at 399.  
 31. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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judgments about scientific, professional or other “expert” 
testimony dealing with the intricacies of particular legislation. 32  
With regard to policing the democratic process, the courts are 
not necessarily any more competent to discern whether it is 
functioning properly or improperly than they are to assess 
licensing schemes. Insofar as the legislative process is iterative 
and dynamic, it may be the case that a law that seems to 
persecute a discrete or insular minority may be a necessary step 
in an attenuated legislative process designed to bring about a 
more just political system.33 If so, is the primary justification for 
judicial interference simply to speed the political process up?  
So, we find ourselves still stuck in our conundrum. If the 
legislature is corrupt, but the courts are not particularly 
competent, what is a citizen or scholar to do? 
VI. The Case for a More Activist Court: Constitutional Confidence 
Regardless of the pitfalls of calling for more judicial activism, 
Klein’s case is firmly grounded in sound principles. The 
marketplace metaphor applies as well to politics as it does to 
economics.34 A strong, but messy, case can be made for more 
judicial oversight of both despite the limits to judicial knowledge 
and the impact of judicial review on the democratic deliberative 
process. 
If we do seek more judicial activism in the name of interstate 
consistency and a better protection of fundamental rights, then 
consistency would dictate that the court protect all rights equally. 
If so, this certainly justifies the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges.35 Certainly, if it is unconscionable for 
                                                                                                     
 32. See generally Gatowski, et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National 
Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV., 433–58; David Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution, 57 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661 (2000); David Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and 
the Birth of Modernity, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893 (2013). 
 33. See generally CHRISTOPHER MANFREDI & MARK RUSH, JUDGING 
DEMOCRACY (2008).  
 34. See generally Samuel Issaccharoff & Richard Pildes, Politics as 
Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 
(1998).  
 35. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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licensed hairdressers, dog groomers, dentists, and fortune-tellers 
to navigate an irrational web of ad hoc and unjustified 
occupational licensing schemes from one state to the next, then it 
stands to reason that spouses in same-sex marriages also ought 
to be protected from the balkanization of marriage law. 
If we are concerned with the integrity and efficiency of 
political as well as economic marketplaces, then there is much to 
be said for an activist judiciary. But there are equally powerful 
arguments against. As Justice Roberts noted in dissent in 
Obergefell:  
The majority expressly disclaims judicial “caution” and omits 
even a pretense of humility, openly relying on its desire to 
remake society according to its own “new insight” into the 
“nature of injustice.” . . . As a result, the Court invalidates the 
marriage laws of more than half the States and orders the 
transformation of a social institution that has formed the basis 
of human society for millennia, for the Kalahari Bushmen and 
the Han Chinese, the Carthaginians and the Aztecs. Just who 
do we think we are?36 
Roberts laments judicial action. But, per Klein’s analysis, 
inaction has an equal but opposite effect. If the economic or 
political marketplace is malfunctioning, how can the Court turn a 
blind eye and simply defer to a romantic, but inaccurate vision of 
deliberative democracy that ignores the realities of public choice 
theory? If Roberts’s assessment of the democratic process is 
accurate, then he and critics of judicial activism can easily find 
solace in the structure of the constitutional system. In response to 
a judicial decision, a legislature may look to pass another law and 
thereby engage in a constitutional dialogue with the Court.37 The 
constitutional system envisions a democracy that is driven by 
clashes among the three branches.38 Perhaps a more activist 
Court would force the elected branches to respond to its decisions 
and, in so doing, reinvigorate American democracy. 
                                                                                                     
 36. Id. at 2612 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 37. See generally LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
(2d ed. 2015). 
 38. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“The accumulation of all 
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, 
a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly 
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”). 
